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FINDING FEDERALISM IN THE
ADMIRALTY: "THE DEVIL'S OWN
MESS" REVISITED*
by J. B. Ruhl**
The federalism aspect of the United States Supreme Court's admiralty jurisprudence has long been adrift.' No feature of admiralty law
illustrates the Court's difficulties in this regard better than maritime
wrongful death remedies. From the beginning of the Court's involve2 to
ment with maritime wrongful death remedies in The Harrisburg
its most recent decision on the subject in Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire,3 the Court's jurisprudence in this area has been characterized by
inconsistency. For example, and as indicative of the problem, a
landmark decision such as The Harrisburgwas followed consistently
for almost 100 years only to be suddenly overruled without warning,4
and conflicts between the justices have led to open bickering resulting
in fractious decisions.5 Moreover, there are curious aberrations which
* Use of the term "the devil's own mess" is taken from Professor (then judicial clerk)
David P. Currie's landmark article entitled Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own
Mess," 1960 Sup. Cr. REv. 158. It would be difficult to improve upon Professor Currie's
insightful and comprehensive analysis of the issue; rather, following a detailed discussion of
the major United States Supreme Court maritime wrongful death remedy cases through 1960,
the author in this article picks up where Professor Currie left off to determine whether, since
1960, the role of federalism in admiralty law has become any clearer. Thus, Professor Currie's
article is highly recommended reading.
** Associate, Fulbright & Jaworski, Austin, Texas; B.A. 1979, J.D. 1982, University of
Virginia; LL.M. 1986, George Washington Universtiy. The author assisted in the briefing and
preparation for oral argument of the petitoner's case in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,
477 U.S. 207, 1986 AMC 2113 (1986), and is deeply indebted to his lead counsel, Keith A.
Jones of Fulbright & Jaworski, Washington, D.C. for many of the concepts upon which this
article is based. Technical assistance from Sherry Young and Lisa M. LeMaster also is
appreciated. The opinions expressed and mistakes made herein are those solely of the author.
1. The author promises that this is his only use of a maritime metaphor in the article; this
one was too hard to resist.
2. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
3. 477 U.S. 207, 1986 AMC 2113 (1986).
4. See, eg., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 409, 1970 AMC 967, 993 (1970),
overruling, The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886); see infra notes 8-11.
5. See, eg., Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340, 1960 AMC 550 (1960) (per
curiam); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 1960 AMC 527 (1960); The Tungus v.
Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 1959 AMC 813 (1959). This trilogy of cases addresses the
question-important only prior to the creation in Moragne, 398 U.S. 375, 1970 AMC 967, of a
federal maritime law remedy for wrongful death--of the extent to which state law could be
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exist in a twilight zone: although never overruled or criticized, such
cases have rarely been followed. 6 Hence, despite the Court's efforts to

achieve a uniform remedy for maritime wrongful death, we are left
with a virtual patchwork of remedies for maritime wrongful death7
and no clear idea of where the next case decided by the Court will

lead us.
A sympathetic student of the Court's jurisprudence of maritime
wrongful death remedies might conclude that the present state of
affairs was inevitable as a result of the Court's bad start in The Harrisburg, where it refused to recognize a federal common law cause of
action for maritime wrongful death under the general maritime law.'
For almost one hundred years, that decision prevented the Court
from shaping a uniform maritime wrongful death remedy, leaving the
problem to Congress and, to a lesser degree, the States to fashion remedies where and when they could. 9 Yet even when it attempted to
borrowed or applied by federal admiralty courts to provide rights and remedies for wrongful
deaths occurring in the States' territorial waters. In these three cases, it took the same nine
justices ten separate opinions to work through the problem and yet, no clear answer was
provided. Thankfully, Moragne mooted the question, albeit leading to several more in its
stead. See infra text accompanying notes 61-72, 75-86.
6. See, e.g., Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); The Hamilton, 207 U.S.
398 (1907). Both of these cases were decided prior to the flurry of federal legislation aimed at
filling in the holes left by the Court. See infra note 9. In Knickerbocker Ice, the Court held
that Congress could not incorporate state workmen's compensation law rights and remedies
into federal admiralty law as a way of providing a federal maritime law remedy for worker
accidents and deaths. The Court reasoned that the admiralty clause of the Constitution, which
extends "[t]he judicial power ... to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, requires a greater degree of uniformity of law than incorporation of
divergent state laws would permit. See 253 U.S. at 160-61. By contrast the Court concluded in
The Hamilton that a state wrongful death statute could apply to a claim for death on the high
seas. See 207 U.S. 403-04. Despite the obvious conceptual conflict between the two cases, the
Court decided Knickerborcker Ice as if The Hamilton had not existed, and it has virtually
ignored both cases since then even when dealing with similar or identical issues. See infra text
accompanying notes 43-46.
7. See Schill, The Unsolvable Puzzle ofMaritime PersonalInjury Litigation:One False Move
and You're Out, 24 Hous. L. REv. 635 (1987) [hereinafter Schill]. Schill provides the most
current, comprehensive and accurate survey of maritime personal injury remedies available.
8. 119 U.S. at 213.
9. Largely in response to the decision in The Harrisburg,Congress enacted the Jones Act in
1920 to provide seamen an action based on negligence against employers, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1986), and the Death on the High Seas Act to provide a
high seas wrongful death remedy, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982 & Supp. III
1986). Other federal statutes controlling maritime personal injury and wrongful death
remedies in certain circumstances include the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See generally Schill, supra note 7.
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correct that problem in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,10 holding
that "an action does lie under the general maritime law for death
caused by violation of maritime duties,"'" the Court failed to fit that
remedy into its then present-day context or to give it the sorely
needed definition to shape what inevitably would follow in maritime
wrongful death litigation.' 2
A more critical student might characterize the Court's law of maritime wrongful death as a history of missed opportunities. Indeed, the
Court unquestionably had opportunities and the power to set straight
its doctrine. After all, admiralty is one of the few areas in which federal common law still is constitutionally permitted to reign in the
absence of conflicting federal legislation.13 The Court, as the final
draftsman of federal common law, was and is in a position to actively
shape maritime wrongful death remedies to meet the constitutional
goal of uniformity in admiralty law. A strong spirit of federalism
would have driven the Court in that direction; instead, however, the
Court developed a crazy-quilt approach to maritime wrongful death
remedies which evidences little faith in the federalist creed.
This article examines the impact of federalism on the law of maritime wrongful death remedies. Its purpose is not to provide a survey
of this area of the law. Rather, as did Professor Currie's article in
1960,14 it is an attempt to determine whether there remains a doctrinal core of federalism in the admiralty around which the Court could
reshape and clarify maritime wrongful death remedies.
Part I of this article provides a history of the jurisprudence of maritime wrongful death remedies prior to 1960. That history illustrates
the growing, finally intense, conflict that the Court's decisions engendered between uniformity of law through federalism and diversity of
law through incorporation of state remedies. It was at the pinnacle of
that conflict when Professor Currie penned his critique of the Court's
approach to federalism and the admiralty. Part II of this article picks
up where Professor Currie left off, in 1960, in his attempt to define
federalism as the proper driving force of admiralty law. Part III of
this article provides the background for and explanation of the
10. 398 U.S. 375, 1970 AMC 967 (1970).
11. Id. at 409, 1970 AMC at 993.
12. The Moragne Court left the task of defining the particular parameters of the general
federal maritime law remedy it created-such as the measure of damages-to "further sifting
through the lower courts in future litigation." 398 U.S. at 408, 1970 AMC at 993.
13. See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981).
14. See Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. Cr.
REv. 158 [hereinafter Currie].
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Court's 1986 decision in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,15 the
case which presented the Court with a long sought opportunity to
depart from its patchwork approach to maritime wrongful death remedies and inject a strong dose of federalism into its admiralty jurisprudence. However, because this opportunity was missed, Part IV of this
article assesses where the Court should go on the issue of federalism
and the admiralty, and whether there is a way out of "The Devil's
Own Mess."
I.

THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH
REMEDIES-UNIFORMITY OF THE WRONG KIND

It is curious that, in a 1981 decision addressing the right of antitrust defendants to contribution from their joint tortfeasors, the Court
singled out admiralty cases as belonging to one of the "narrow areas"
in which the federal courts still may formulate "what has come to be
known as 'federal common law,'" meaning that "our federal system
does not permit the controversy to be resolved under state law."1 6
What makes this broad, powerful statement so curious is that many of
the Court's admiralty decisions dealing with maritime wrongful death
remedies betray no such respect for the exalted status of federal common law. To be sure, the Court's admiralty decisions have recognized
the inherently federal nature of admiralty law. Early in its jurisprudence, the Court took note of the Constitution's extension of "[tihe
judicial Power ... to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.' 1 7 The effect of this extension was explained in The

Lottawanna:'8
[o]ne thing . . . is unquestionable; the Constitution must

have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could
not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of
maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several states, as that would have defeated the uniformity and
consistency at which the Constitution aimed ....19
15. 477 U.S. 207, 1986 AMC 2113 (1986).
16. Texas Industries,451 U.S. 630, 640-641 (1981).
17. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
18. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
19. Id. at 575. The Admiralty Clause thus "empower[s] the federal courts... to draw on
the substantive law 'inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction'... and to continue
the development of this law within constitutional limits." Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-61, 1959 AMC 832, 837 (1959) (quoting Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 55, 1932 AMC 355, 371 (1932)). Furthermore, "[i]t empower[s] Congress to
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Nonetheless, the early development of a maritime wrongful death
remedy was marked by one dominant question: To what degree would
state law control "the rules and limits of maritime law."' 20
A.

The Court Gets Off To A Bad Start

What set the paradox of federalism and the admiralty in motion
2 1 There, a widow
was undoubtedly the decision in The Harrisburg.
brought suit to recover damages for her husband's death against the
steamer HARRISBURG, a vessel registered in Philadelphia. The
death was allegedly caused by the negligence of the decedent's vessel
in colliding with the schooner MARIETTA TILTON off the Massachusetts coast. It was not specified whether the death took place in
territorial waters or on the high seas, a point which would become of
critical importance in later cases. The deceased was an officer of the
schooner and a resident of Delaware. Suit was brought under the
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts state wrongful death laws and under
general maritime law. Suit was fied in federal district court under its
admiralty jurisdiction.22
The statutory actions were found to be untimely by the lower
court;23 thus, the Supreme Court addressed only the general maritime
law claim. In that regard, the Court asked whether "a suit in admiralty may be maintained in the courts of the United States to recover
damages for the death of a human being on the high seas, or waters
navigable from the sea, caused by negligence, in the absence of an act
24
of Congress, or a statute of a state, giving a right of action therefor?"
After concluding that the then current rule in England and the
United States did not provide for a general common law wrongful
death remedy,2" the Court decided that no different rule had been or
should now be applied in admiralty.26 Hence, the Court concluded
that "in the absence of a statute giving the right ...

no such action

revise and supplement the maritime law within the limits of the Constitution." Id. at 361,
1959 AMC at 837. These principles are consistent with the views of the Constitution's
framers. See 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 532 (1836). (For example, Governor Randolph
stated in the Virginia Debates that "[c]ases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction cannot, with
propriety, be vested in particular state courts."). Id. at 571.
20. 88 U.S. at 575.
21. 119 U.S. 199 (1986).
22. See id.
23. Id. at 214.
24. Id. at 204.
25. Id. at 204-05.
26. Id. at 205, 213.
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will lie in the courts of the United States under the general maritime
law."27 Significantly, the Court appears to have contemplated the
application of state statutes and to have made no distinction between
territorial waters and the high seas.
The invitation in The Harrisburg to apply statutory remedies to
maritime wrongful deaths was taken up initially not by Congress but
by the Court itself in its decision in The Hamilton.28 The steamship
HAMILTON collided on the high seas with THE SAGINAW, killing
three crewmembers as well as a passenger of THE SAGINAW. Both
vessels belonged to Delaware corporations and both were found to be
negligent in the collision. The decedents' representatives brought
wrongful death actions in federal district court under the Delaware
wrongful death statute. 29 The Court took the case as presenting the
question of "whether the Delaware statute applies to a claim for death
on the high seas, arising purely from tort, in proceedings in admiralty."30 As a constitutional matter, the court found that a state statute could so apply based on the following reasoning:
Apart from the subordination of the State of Delaware to
the Constitution of the United States there is no doubt that
it would have had power to make its statute applicable to
this case. . . . The first question, then, is narrowed to
whether there is anything in the structure of the National
Government and under the Constitution of the United
States that takes away or qualifies the authority that otherwise Delaware would possess.
The power of Congress to legislate upon the subject has been
derived both from the power to iegulate commerce and
from the clause in the Constitution extending the judicial
power to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
Art. III, § 2. The doubt in this case arises as to the power of
the States where Congress has remained silent.
That doubt, however, cannot be serious. The grant of
admiralty jurisdiction, followed and constructed by the
Judiciary Act of 1789, "saving to suitors in all cases the
right of a common law remedy where the common law is
competent to give it," Rev. Stats. § 563, cl. 8, leaves open
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 213.
207 U.S. 398 (1907).
See id. at 402-03.
Id. at 403.
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the common law jurisdiction of the state courts over torts
committed at sea.3 '
By injecting the "saving to suitors" clause of the Judicial Code 32 into
the analysis, The Hamilton created even more confusion on the subject than had The Harrisburg. The "saving to suitors" clause provides
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all maritime cases
"saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled. '3 3 However, this clause could be interpreted in
different ways depending on the influence of federalism on admiralty.
It may mean that all state law rights and remedies are available
independent of federal admiralty law. It may also mean that federal
admiralty law incorporates all state remedies for enforcement of federal rights. Finally, it may mean that states which provide a remedial
forum for maritime wrongs may hear maritime cases, but must apply
federal maritime law. As the Court stated later in Caldarola v. Eckert,34 the essential issue is "[w]hether Congress thereby recognized
that there were common law rights in the States as to matters also
cognizable in admiralty, or whether it was concerned only with 'saving' to the States the power to use their courts to vindicate rights
deriving from the maritime law to the extent their common law remedies may be available.... ,3 In short, the issue is whether state law
"is the source of the right or merely affords a means for enforcing
it." 36

The decision in The Hamilton implied rather strongly that state law
could be the independent source of maritime wrongful death rights
and remedies. No doubt the Court saw this result as necessary to
ameliorate the harsh results created by The Harrisburg. However, the
constitutional objective of a uniform admiralty remedy guided by federal common law should have directed a contrary interpretation,
31. Id. at 403-04.
32. Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331(1) (1986).
33. Id.
34. 332 U.S. 155, 1947 AMC 847 (1947).
35. Id. at 157, 1947 AMC at 848-49.
36. Id. at 158, 1947 AMC at 849. The Court has more often endorsed the latter
interpretation. See, e.g., Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918), where the
Court stated:
under the saving clause a right sanctioned by the maritime law may be enforced
through any appropriate remedy recognized at common law; but we find
nothing therein which reveals an intention to give the complaining party an
election to determine whether the defendant's liablility shall be measured by
common-law standards rather than those of the maritime law.
Id. at 384.
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requiring that The Harrisburg be overruled and a federal common
law or statutory maritime wrongful death remedy be provided.
Instead, by appearing to sanction state law as the source of both right
and remedy, the Court opened the way for fifty years of consititutional struggle.
Despite its decision in The Hamilton, the Court used a stronger
federalism-based approach in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen.37 In Jensen, a dockworker was killed in an accident on a berthed vessel's
gangway. Suit was brought against the deceased's employer, Southern Pacific Company, in New York state court under New York's
Workmen's Compensation Act. Southern Pacific challenged that Act
as an unconstitutional intrusion on federal admiralty jurisdiction.38
Accordingly, the Court considered whether "the Workmen's Compensation Act conflicts with the general maritime law." 3 9 In concluding that it did, the Court looked again to the Constitution's so-called
admiralty clause 4° and pronounced:
[I]t must now be accepted as settled doctrine that in consequence of these provisions Congress has paramount power
to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail
through the country.... And further, that in the absence of
some controlling statute the general maritime law constitutes . .. part of our national law applicable to matters
within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.... Equally
well established is the rule that state statutes may not contravene an applicable act of Congress or affect the general
maritime law beyond certain limits.
And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law or interferes with the
proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations. This limitation, at the least,
is essential to the effective operation of the fundamental purposes for which such law was incorporated into our national
laws by the Constitution itself.41
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

244 U.S. 205 (1917).
Id. at 210.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 215-16.
Id.
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Jensen thus appears to have set up a three-part test for determining
when state law may validly operate in the maritime context. First,
state law may not be inconsistent with federal statutes. Second, state
law may not be inconsistent with general maritime law. Finally, state
law may not interfere with the harmony and uniformity of maritime
law in its international and interstate relations.
However, the Jensen Court inexplicably reconciled that test with
the result in The Hamilton by including, in dicta, "the right to recover
in death cases" 42 as one of the categories qualifying under the threepart test for application of state law. The Jensen Court thus proclaimed that application of state wrongful death remedies on the high
seas was not inconsistent with federal statutes or general maritime law
and would not interfere with the harmony or uniformity of general
maritime law in its international and interstate relations. It is this
idea-one which is wholly repugnant to the concept of a uniform federal remedy for wrongful death-which came under intense criticism
in later cases.
Indeed, in Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,4 3 the Court reviewed a
law Congress enacted on the heels of Jensen which affected federal
admiralty jurisdiction by saving "to [admiralty] claimants the rights
and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any State." 4
By ensuring through federal statutory law that the first of Jensen's
three tests would be satisfied, Congress apparently hoped to avoid the
problem that had caused the state law in Jensen to be held unconstitutional. But the Knickerbocker Ice Court found that Jensen stated a
constitutional principle that could not be circumvented by this sort of
legislative decree. As the Court explained:
The Constitution itself adopted and established, as part of
the laws of the United States, approved rules of the general
maritime law and empowered Congress to legislate in
respect of them and other matters within the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction. Moreover, it took from the States all
power, by legislation or judicial decision, to contravene the
essential purposes of, or to work material injury to, characteristic features of such law or to interfere with its proper
harmony and uniformity in its international and interstate
relations. To preserve adequate harmony and appropriate
42. Id. at 216.
43. 253 U.S. 149 (1920).
44. Id. at 156.
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uniform rules relating to maritime matters and bring them
within control of the Federal Government was the fundamental purpose; and to such definite end Congress was
empowered to legislate within that sphere.4 5
In essence, the KnickerbockerIce Court used the three-part test enunciated in Jensen to create a higher level of preemption than ever
before (or since) conceived-a preemption of constitutional magnitude which prevented even Congress from acting to diminish its
effects. Indeed, the Court explicitly recognized that no mere commerce power preemption was at play in its admiralty cases, explaining
that "[t]he distinction between the indicated situation created by the
Constitution relative to maritime affairs and the one resulting from
the mere grant of power to regulate commerce without more, should
not be forgotten."4 6
Yet forgotten it promptly was, in Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia47 as
the Court again attempted to mold its increasingly complex rules to a
new situation. In Garcia, a stevedore was killed in the hold of a Norwegian vessel which was anchored in San Francisco Bay. The decedent's widow sued under the California Workmen's Compensation
Act in state court. The California court found the action to be
45. Id. at 160.
46. Id. at 161. Along with Knickerbocker, the Court has applied the Jensen preemption
analysis in several cases to prevent application of state law in admiralty. See, e.g., Washington
v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 1924 AMC 403 (1924) (workmen's compensation);
Peters v. Veasey, 251 U.S. 121 (1919) (workmen's compensation); Union Fish Co. v. Erickson,
248 U.S. 308 (1919) (employment contract); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372
(1918) (indemnification); Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255 (1917) (workmen's
compensation). In numerous other cases, however, the Court had denied application of state
law without reference to the Jensen preemption analysis. See, eg., Kossick v. United Fruit
Co., 365 U.S. 731, 1961 AMC 833 (1961) (statute of frauds); Kermarec v. Compagnie
Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 1959 AMC 597 (1959) (comparative negligence); Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 1954 AMC 837 (1954) (direct action statute); Messel v.
Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 427, 1927 AMC 1047 (1927) (personal injury suit); Robins Dry
Dock Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449, 1925 AMC 182 (1925) (same); Carlisle Packing Co. v.
Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922) (same). See also The Roanoke 189 U.S. 185 (1903) (maritime
liens); Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900) (municipal immunity law).
Nonetheless, the Court has been particularly tolerant of state law setting the standards and
remedies for some forms of conduct in the maritime sphere. Generally this has been true
where there has been no federal law addressed to the object sought to be achieved by the state
law, as is often the case with environmental and safety regulations. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 1978 AMC 527 (1978) (conservation and environmental
protection measures); Askew v. American Waterways Operations, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 1973
AMC 811 (1973) (state pollution liability law); Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440,
1960 AMC 1549 (1960) (state anti-pollution law).
47. 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
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untimely. Suit was then brought in federal court under admiralty
jurisdiction, again pursuant to the state law.48 Both the federal district and appeals courts upheld the action against a motion to dismiss
for untimeliness. 49 Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the case
on the ground of untimeliness. 50 For reasons unstated, however, the
Court first reviewed its jurisprudence on the issue of admiralty preemption-explaining the holdings in The Harrisburg,The Hamilton,
Jensen, and Knickerbocker Ice 5 1-and addressed the hypothetical
question of whether the state law remedy could have applied in the
admiralty action had it been timely brought. Concluding that state
law could apply, the Court explained:
As the logical result of prior decisions we think it follows
that, where death upon such waters results from a maritime
tort committed on navigable waters within a State whose
statutes give a right of action on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts will entertain a libel in personam for the damages sustained by those to whom such
right is given. The subject is maritime and local in character
and the specified modification of or supplement to the rule
applied in admiralty courts, when following the common
law, will not work material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law, nor interfere with the
proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations. 2
Nonetheless, there was no reason for the Court to address this constitutional issue when the state limitations law disposed of the case.
The Court apparently took the opportunity to give substance to the
dicta in Jensen, where it had cited The Hamilton, and confirmed that
the ruling in The Hamilton, at least with respect to actions for deaths
in territorial waters, withstood the test of Jensen. This shows that
Jensen did impose a new test for application of state law to maritime
wrongful death remedies; if it had not, Garcia could have been
decided on the basis of The Hamilton alone. The maritime and local
standard announced in Garcia thus served as a shorthand way for the
Court to say that no inconsistency with federal statutory or general
maritime law would result by applying state wrongful death statutes
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 238-39.
Id. at 239-40.
See id. at 243-44.
Id. at 241-42.
Id. at 242.
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in territorialwaters. Of course, by explicitly adopting the Jensen test,

Garcia impliedly left open the question whether this maritime and
local finding would sustain The Hamilton out on the high seas.
The Court's decisions through Garcia do not make clear whether
its analysis decided an issue of state legislative power or federal judicial power. The failure to elaborate on that distinction left situations
arising on the high seas uncertain in 1920. In The Hamilton, the
Court appeared to have decided the issue as one of preemption, ruling
in effect, if not expressly, that a state law could apply on the high seas
by its own force. Because it involved state regulation and a state
court remedy, Jensen could also be characterized as a preemption
case. However, Jensen may be regarded as a preemption case only in
terms of its new-found special meaning in admiralty, and not in terms
of the straightforward commerce clause preemption which, arguably,
was what decided The Hamilton. Garcia confirmed that Jensen
requires a specialized preemption analysis for admiralty questions and
applied that analysis to maritime wrongful death remedies in state
territorial waters, but not on the high seas. After Garcia, then, it was
not entirely clear how the Court would have decided the facts of The
Hamilton in 1920, i.e., whether it would have strained Jensen, and the
constitutional objective of uniformity through federalism, to characterize wrongful deaths on the high seas as maritime and local. In all
likelihood, the Court would have extended state remedies to the high
seas, since otherwise no remedy at all would have been available.
Such a case, however, never reached the Court, for Congress took the
next initiative.
B.

Congress Tries To Patch Things Up, But The Court Makes A
Bigger Mess Elsewhere
The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) 3 represented a muchdelayed legislative reaction to the decisions in The Harrisburgand
The Hamilton. Although the Court may have intended to foster harmony, practitioners found that reliance upon state law as a remedy
for maritime death, particularly those occuring on the high seas, was
unsatisfactory for many reasons. Inherent limitations on state legislative jurisdiction, conflicting state legal standards, and the absence of
clear rules governing choice of law produced confusion.5 4 In
53. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982).
54. State wrongful death remedies vary widely on such fundamental issues as duty of care,
measure of damages, theories of liability, defenses, immunities, classes of beneficiaries and

statutes of limitations. See Sea-Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 586-87, 1973 AMC
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response, several early bills were introduced to Congress which
attempted to establish a uniform and exclusive federal wrongful death
remedy for all navigable waters. These bills repeatedly failed as they
collided with the desire of local practitioners to maintain state remedies for state territorial waters.16 Thus begining in 1915, the Maritime Law Association proposed a series of bills aimed at establishing a
uniform federal remedy solely for the high seas, while leaving the
state remedies free to operate on state territorial waters. 7 In 1920,
after extensive redrafting of and debates on a proposed statute, the
DOHSA was enacted. 8 DOHSA established a cause of action in
admiralty for any wrongful death "occuring on the high seas beyond a
marine league from the shore of any State."5 9 Although DOHSA succeeded in creating a federal law of wrongful death exclusively for the
high seas, its impact on the overall scheme was negligible. Admiralty
courts continued to adopt and apply state wrongful death statutes in
territorial waters after 1920, because territorial waters were
untouched by DOHSA and maritime torts occuring in such waters
had been determined by Garcia to be local in character.e6 Eventually,
however, litigants placed increasing pressure on the Court by seeking
incorporation of larger aspects of state law than could be justified
under the plain meaning of Garcia and Jensen.
Facing such claims, the Court's jurisprudence began to unravel, in
The Tungus v. Skovgaard.61 While docked in New Jersey, a vessel's
cargo pumps broke down. The repairman called to fix them slipped
§§ 3.1, 3.45
(2d ed. 1975 & Supp. 1985). Moreover, there is not an established rule or intuitively correct
procedure for determining which state's wrongful death statute should govern a situation as
complex as may occur in maritime areas; for example, where decedents resided in states A, B
and C, joint tort-feasors reside in states C and D, survivors reside in states A, B and E, and the
accident occurred nearest the waters of State F. See generally Currie, The Choice Among State
Laws in Maritime Death Cases, 21 VAND. L. REV. 297 (1968).
55. For a history of congressional and professional proceedings leading to enactment of
DOHSA complied by one of the proponents of a federal statute, see Hughes, Death Actions in
Admiralty, 31 YALE L.J. 115, 116-19 (1921). See also Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire,
477 U.S. 207, 220-30, 1986 AMC 2113, 2135-45 (1986).
56. For a thorough discussion of the developments and political forces leading up to
DOHSA's enactment written in the context of the issues raised in Tallentire, see Motion of
Kenneth G. Engerrand for leave to file Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief in Support of the
Position of Petitioners, Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 1986 AMC 2113
(1986) (No. 85-202) (hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief).
57. See, e.g., S. 4288, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916); H.R. 9919, 64th Cong., Ist Sess. (1916).
58. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1982 & Supp. III 1986).
59. Id. at 761.
60. See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
61. 358 U.S. 588, 1959 AMC 813 (1959).
2572, 2583-84 (1974); STUART M. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
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and fell to his death. His widow commenced suit in admiralty to
recover damages for wrongful death under the New Jersey statute.62
DOHSA provided no remedy since the death occured in state territorial waters. Accordingly, the Court confirmed that the New Jersey
wrongful death statue must be applied.63 It was unclear, however
what law governed the right under which the state law remedies could
be sought; that is, whether the application of state wrongful death
laws in territorial waters flowed from a recognition of state legislative
competence in that area or from some loosely-defined federal practice
of borrowing or incorporating state remedies as federal rights. In The
Tungus, the majority concluded that where state law was recognized
as providing a remedy for wrongful death, it would also "determine
the circumstances under which that right exists. The power of the
State to create such a right includes of necessity the power to determine when recovery shall be permitted and when it shall not."4 In
The Tungus, the action was based on a claim of unseaworthiness of
the vessel, and although it was uncertain whether the state law provided a cause of action for unseaworthiness, 65 the majority concluded
it did. Thus, the Court held that an action could be brought in admiralty in that case.6 6 The dissenters, however, viewed the state law as
merely supplying a remedy to be incorporated by federal substantive
maritime law, just as state statutes of limitation often are incorporated
as the federal rule of law.67 The dissenters saw their approach as
assisting the objective of uniformity required by Jensen.68
In two cases following shortly after The Tungus, the dispute among
the Justices over how much state law had to be borrowed, or how
much state law avoided preemption, generated eight separate opinions. The "borrowing-preemption" distinction was central to the
debate. For example, in Hess v. United States,69 Justice Harlan's dissent argued that The Hamilton was a case decided on preemption
grounds in which "state-created rights [were allowed to be] asserted
only by federal permission.""° By contrast, Justice Whittaker's dis62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 589-90, 1959 AMC at 814-15.
See id. at 591, 1959 AMC at 815-16.
Id. at 594, 1957 AMC at 818.
See id. at 595-96, 1959 AMC at 818-19.

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. at 596, 1959 AMC at 819.
See id. at 604, 1959 AMC at 825-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
See id. at 601, 1959 AMC at 823-24.
361 U.S. 314, 1960 AMC 527 (1960).
Id. at 335, 1960 AMC at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).

1988]

FEDERALISM IN ADMIRALTY

senting opinion in Goett v. Union Carbide Corp.71 indicated that he
thought the majority in The Tungus had conceived of federal admiralty law merely as "remedially supplemented" by the borrowing of
72
state law.
It was in respect to this confused context that Professor Currie
attempted to make sense of the Court's jurisprudence. Speaking of
federalism in admiralty in general, and not just to maritime wrongful
death remedies, he reached a telling, albeit cynical, conclusion as to
where the Court's decisions had led:
An examination of the Court's treatment of maritime cases
in the past twenty years leaves little room for any explanation other than that the Court is seeking the best of both
worlds; it makes use of state law when it feels that law desirable as a supplement to maritime law. If the maritime rule
is undersirable, the Court is usually reluctant to change it;
often the reason is that the decision would be "legislative."
If the state law would impair a federal right, ... it is never
applied. If it would create a right that is undesirable for
other reasons, it will be ignored.... If it creates a right that
is desirable,... it will be applied; the interest in uniformity
will be ignored, a contrary federal rule will be conveniently
slipped under the rug, the wrongful death.., cases will be
earnestly cited, and the subject will be declared
"untouched" by maritime law. If . . . state law is not
favorable and the old maritime rule is inadequate, the Court
will resort to judicial creativity.73
To a large extent, this critique remains applicable today; yet, Professor Currie's vision for how the Court should correct these deficiencies
is even more timely. He posited:
When the Supreme Court takes a more active view of its
responsibilities in developing a rational common law to the
sea, and when it pays more attention to relevant state and
federal interests and to consistency between decisions, it
may escape the tangle and seaweed which has long
obstructed the development of this branch of the law....
Unfortunately, this vision has not yet come to be.
71.
72.
73.
74.

361 U.S. 340, 1960 AMC 550 (1960).
Id. at 345 (Whittaker, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Currie, supra note 14, at 219.
Id. at 221.
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FROM MORAGNE To HGGINBOTHAM-A NEW UNIFORMITY
LEADS TO ANOTHER NONUNIFORMITY

Hess and Goett illustrated the futility of relying on state law as the
source of maritime wrongful death remedies; if uniformity is the goal
of the admiralty clause of the Constitution, reliance on state law
would never accomplish the task. Apparently, however, it was not
until Moragne v. States Marine Lines Inc.75 that the Court realized
that The Harrisburghad prevented them from ever taking advantage
of the uniformity a federalism-based approach offered.
Moragne, a longshoreman, was killed while working aboard a vessel within the territorial waters of Florida. Suit was brought in federal district court in Florida against the shipowner to recover
damages for wrongful death. The complaint alleged both negligence
and unseaworthiness of the vessel as the cause of the accident. The
district court held that the Florida wrongful death law did not encompass unseaworthiness as a basis of liability.76 Although this issue was
decided in The Tungus," the Moragne Court nonetheless heard the
case "to consider whether The Harrisburg,... in which this Court
held in 1886 that maritime law does not afford a cause of action for
'78
wrongful death, should any longer be regarded as acceptable law."
Hence, the problems inherent in The Tungus were seen as symptoms
79
of The Harrisburg.
Sensibly, The Harrisburgwas overruled on the ground that wrongful death remedies had become widely available since The Harrisburg
was decided.80 The more important holding, however, was "that
Congress has given no affirmative indication of an intent to preclude
the judicial allowance of a remedy for wrongful death .... "8 1 Commenting on the evolution of the law in this field, the Court stated that
[t]he void that existed in maritime law up until 1920 was the
absence of any remedy for wrongful death on the high seas.
Congress, in acting to fill that void, legislated only to the
three-mile limit because that was the extent of the problem.
75. 398 U.S. 375, 1970 AMC 967 (1970).
76. See id. at 376-77, 1970 AMC at 969.
77. 358 U.S. 588, 1959 AMC 813 (1959).
78. 398 U.S. at 375-76, 1970 AMC at 968-69 (citations omitted).
79. As the Court stated, "[t]he primary source of the confusion is not to be found in The
Tungus but in The Harrisburg..
" Id. at 378, 1970 AMC at 970.
80. See id. at 380-93, 1970 AMC at 970-81 (providing a discussion of the history of
wrongful death remedies in the United States).
81. Id. at 393, 1970 AMC at 981.
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The express provision that state remedies in territorial
waters were not disturbed by the Act ensured that Congress'
solution of one problem would not create another by inviting the courts to find that the Act preempted the entire field,2
destroying the state remedies that had previously existed.
The Court thus expressed its belief that the "recognition of a right to
recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure
uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state
83
remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts."
Apparently, the Court had finally realized that "[flederal law, rather
than state, is the more appropriate source of a remedy for violation of
the federally imposed duties of maritime law."' 84 The real breakthrough, however, was the characterization of the duties, not merely
'85
the remedies, as "federally imposed.
Nevertheless, because the remedy created in Moragne was poorly
defined, it reduced the potency of the federalism which the Court had
injected into the analysis. Indeed, the Moragne Court expressly stated
that many of the issues left unresolved by Moragne (e.g., its application to deaths arising on the high seas) would be "grist for the judicial
mill."18 6 Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet87 was the mill for one such
issue. In Gaudet, the Court considered whether Moragne allows
recovery for damages beyond those authorized by DOHSA when the
wrongful death occurs in state territorial waters. Based on its analysis
of rules applied by the majority of the States, the Court authorized
recovery for loss of support and services, as allowed by DOHSA, but
also for loss of society and funeral expenses, neither of which are
authorized by DOHSA for high seas cases.88 The Court felt this interpretation of Moragne was not contrary to congressional intent in
enacting DOHSA:
[w]e concluded in Moragne that Congress expressed "no
intention.., of foreclosing any nonstatutory federal remedies that might be found appropriate to effectuate the policies of general maritime law." Nothing in the legislative
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 398, 1970 AMC at 985.
Id. at 401, 1970 AMC at 987.
Id. at 401 n.15, 1970 AMC at 987-88 n.15.
Id.
Id. at 408, 1970 AMC at 993.
414 U.S. 573, 1973 AMC 2572 (1974).
See id. at 584-92, 1973 AMC at 2581-86.
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history of the Act suggests that Congress intended the Act's
statutory measure of damages to preempt any additional elements of damage for a maritime wrongful death remedy
which this Court might deem "appropriate to effectuate the
policies of general maritime law." To the contrary, Congress' insistence that the Act not extend to territorial waters,
indicates that Congress was not concerned that there be a
uniform measure of damages for wrongful deaths occuring
within admiralty's jurisdiction, for in many instances state
wrongful death statutes extending to territorial waters provided a more liberal measure of damages than the Death on
the High Seas Act. 9
Curiously, however, the Court precluded awards for mental anguish
or grief as such non-pecuniary losses are "not compensable under the
maritime wrongful death remedy." 90
Gaudet thus created the potential for a new kind of confusion, one
in which certain non-pecuniary losses were uniformly available under
a Moragne type action versus the uniform unavailability of such damages in a DOHSA action. Predictably, lower courts reached conflicting results. 91 This conflict was addressed by the Court in Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Higginbotham,9z which presented the question of "whether,
in addition to the damages authorized by federal statute, a decedent's3
9g
survivors may also recover damages under general maritime law."
In Higginbotham, after a helicopter crashed on the high seas killing its
crew and passengers, one passenger's widow brought suit in admiralty
seeking damages under DOHSA and recovery for "loss of society"
under Moragne.94 Following a recap of the previous century's legal
developments in this area, 95 the Court proceeded to limit Gaudet's
effect to territorial waters and thus the requested damages were
denied. 96 The Court's rationale focused on the distinction between
the legislative and common law sources of maritime law:
The Death on the High Seas Act ...

announces Congress'

89. Id. at 588 n.22, 1973 AMC at 2583-84 n.22 (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 585 n.17, 1983 AMC at 2582 n.17.
91. Compare Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 1975 AMC 204 (lst Cir. 1974) (no Gaudet
remedy on high seas) with Law v. Sea Drilling Corp., 523 F.2d 793, 1977 AMC 2394 (5th Cir.
1975) (Gaudet does apply on the high seas).
92. 436 U.S. 618, 1978 AMC 1059 (1978).
93. Id. at 618, 1978 AMC at 1060.
94. See id. at 619, 1978 AMC at 1060-61.
95. Id. at 620-23, 1978 AMC at 1061-63.
96. Id. at 621-26, 1978 AMC at 1063-66.
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considered judgment on such issues as the beneficiaries, the
limitations period, contributory negligence, survival, and
damages. The Act does not address every issue of wrongful
death law but when it does speak directly to a question, the
courts are not free to "supplement" Congress' answer so
thoroughly that the Act becomes meaningless.
There is a basic difference between filling a gap left by
Congress' silence and rewriting rules that Congress has
affirmatively and specifically enacted. In the area covered
by the statute, it would be no more appropriate to prescribe
a different measure of damages than to prescribe a different
statute of limitations, or a different class of beneficiaries. 97
Thus, Higginbotham simultaneously preserved uniformity of maritime wrongful death remedies on the high seas while creating a disparity between such remedies and the Moragne/Gaudet remedy
available in state territorial waters. While this disparity would seem
to have violated the constitutional principles underlying Moragnei.e., achieving the uniformity of remedy mandated by the Constitution-the Higginbotham Court attempted to reconcile the resultant
lack of uniformity on policy grounds:
Moragne proclaimed the need for uniformity in a far more
compelling context. When Moragne was decided, fatal accidents on the high seas had an adequate federal remedy,
while the same accidents nearer shore might yield more generous awards, or none at all, depending on the law of the
nearest State. The only disparity that concerns us today is
the difference between applying one national rule to fatalities in territorial waters and a slightly narrower national
rule to accidents farther from land. 98
Hence, the Court replaced one disjointed system with another.
Clearly, the law of maritime wrongful death remedies after Gaudet
and Higginbotham was not what Professor Currie had hoped to
encourage in his critique of the Court's admiralty jurisprudence. An
approach based truly on the objective of uniformity through federalism would have relied on DOHSA to provide the parameters of
wrongful death remedies for the high seas and for territorial waters.
Higginbotham correctly prevented federal common law from under97. Id. at 625, 1978 AMC at 1065 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 624 n.18, 1978 AMC at 1064 n.18.
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mining the legislative directive of uniformity for high seas remedies.
But Gaudet distorted the Moragne action for deaths in territorial
waters by relying on state law as the source for the content of the
general federal maritime remedy. The fact that the Court was
inclined to look landward to fluctuating, uncertain notions of state
law rather than seaward to the federal legislature's fixed, uniform
maritime death remedy indicates that the Court was not yet fully
committed to achieving uniformity through federalism. Consequently, as Gaudet and Higginbotham concerned only the content of
the federal remedies, the overarching question of the law of maritime
wrongful death remedies remained unanswered: could state law provide an independent source of maritime wrongful death action as
regards both rights and remedies?
III.

COMING FULL CIRCLE-TALLENTIRE PRESENTS THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ACHIEVE THE LONG SOUGHT-AFTER
UNIFORMITY THROUGH FEDERALISM

Although Higginbotham and Gaudet did not explicitly address the

role of state law as an independent source of right and remedy for
maritime wrongful death, the very notion of allowing state law to
apply a remedial system parallel to that provided by federal law
through the Moragne and DOHSA remedies was irreconcilable with
the rationales behind both of them. Although Gaudet incorporated
state law as the Moragne remedy on territorial waters, it did so uniformly by adopting state law as the rule for all territorial waters. Presumably, had the Gaudet Court believed that each state's law could
provide an independent source of right and remedy for wrongful
deaths in each state's respective territorial waters, it would not have
constricted the Moragne remedy. Similarly, the result in Higginbotham-preventing application of the Moragne remedy on the high seas
as a supplement to or definitive source for DOHSA remedies-is
repugnant to the notion of applying diverse state laws on the high seas
separately from or as a definitive source for interpreting DOHSA.
Accordingly, and until the Fifth Circuit's decision in Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics Inc.," courts construed Moragne and DOHSA as pre99. 754 F.2d 1274, 1986 AMC 23 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 207, 1986 AMC 2113
(1986). Curiously, the Fifth Circuit had concluded only three years prior, albeit in dicta, that
state wrongful death remedies probably could not apply to high seas deaths. See Vaz Borralho
v. Keydril Co., 696 F.2d 379, 384 n.6, 1984 AMC 728, 731 n.6 (5th Cir. 1983). Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit had specifically held that DOHSA preempts state law remedies, only to have that
decision reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds. See Dore v. Link Belt Co., 391
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empting the application of state law in any such manner to maritime
wrongful death remedies." °°
A.

The Court of Appeals: The Hamilton Revived

In Tallentire, a helicopter transporting offshore oil platform workers to the mainland crashed approximately 35 miles off the coast of
Louisiana, killing all onboard. 0 1 The survivors of two workers filed
wrongful death suits in the Louisiana federal district court against the
owner of the helicopter, raising claims under DOHSA and the wrongful death law of Louisiana.10 2 The state remedy provided for recovery
of certain nonpecuniary damages, such as loss of consortium, service
F.2d 671, 1968 AMC 1454 (5th Cir. 1968), rev'don other groundssub nom. Rodrigue v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 1969 AMC 1082 (1969). Neither of these prior decisions
were found to be controlling or persuasive in the Fifth Circuit's treatment of Tallentire. See
754 F.2d at 1278 n.4, 1282, 1986 AMC at 26 n.4.
100. For cases preventing state law from applying to maritime deaths in territorial waters
after the Moragne remedy was created, see, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473
(9th Cir. 1980). For cases preventing state law from applying to high seas deaths, see Nygaard
v. Peter Pan Sea Foods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80, 1985 AMC 2085, 2088 (9th Cir. 1983); Barbe v.
Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 801 n.10, 1975 AMC 204, 213 n.10 (1st Cir. 1974); see also Wilson
v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 91, 1954 AMC 1697, 1707 (N.D. Cal. 1954)
(collecting district court cases). Scholarly consensus both predicted and agreed with these
opinions. See Day, Maritime Wrongful Death andSurvival Recovery: The Need for Legislative
Reform, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 648, 651 (1964); Comment, Maritime Wrongful Death After
Moragne: The Seaman's Legal Lifeboat, 59 GEo. L.J. 1411, 1417 (1971); Comment, The
TangledSeine: A Survey of MaritimePersonalInjury Remedies, 57 YALE L.J. 243, 271 (1947);
Robinson, Wrongful Death in Admiralty and the Conflict of Laws, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 406,
410 n.19 (1936); Magruder & Grout, Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 35
YALE L.J. 395, 422-23 (1926); Hughes, Death Actions in Admiralty, 31 YALE L.J. 115, 119
(1921). See generally Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 231 n.3, 1986 AMC
2113, 2132-33 n.3 (1986) (recognizing the weight of scholarly opinion).
101. 754 F.2d at 1276, 1986 AMC at 24.
102. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1986). A claim also was made that the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), which requires use of state tort law as surrogate
federal law for artificial islands and fixed structures in the outer Continental Shelf, see 43
U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1986), would apply because the decedents were platform workers
being transported from oil platforms (artificial islands) over the high seas to their mainland
homes and thus died in connection with matters more related to OCSLA than to DOHSA.
See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 217-18, 1986 AMC 2113, 2122 (1986).
The Court, however, ruled that application of state law under OCSLA is purely an issue of
location, not of status or purpose. Id at 218, 1986 AMC at 2123. Moreover, OCSLA will
apply only to "fatalities intimately connected with the decedents' work on the platform" where
there is also a close "proximity of the workers' accidents to the platforms." Id. at 219, 1986
AMC at 2123. Furthermore, the fact that the deaths took place in a helicopter, rather than a
more traditional maritime conveyance, was not deemed relevant to the choice between OCSLA
and DOHSA, for "that helicopter was engaged in a function traditionally performed by
waterborne vessels: the ferrying of passengers from an 'island,' albeit an artificial one, to the
shore." Id., 1986 AMC at 2122-23 (citations omitted).
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and society,° 3 which are not available under DOHSA. 104 The district
court granted the defendent's motion for summary judgment precluding recovery under the state law, thus limiting the possible damages to
those authorized under DOHSA. On appeal by the survivors, however, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and held that the
'05
state law remedy applied to the high seas deaths "of its own force."'
In a manner reminiscent of The Hamilton, the Fifth Circuit's holding focused on two questions: whether the state has legislative jurisdiction to promulgate rights and remedies for high seas deaths and, if
so, whether Congress through DOHSA had acted to preempt or in
any way limit such power.'06 In answering the first question affirmatively, the Fifth Circuit ignored entirely the "maritime and local" test
enunciated in Garcia107 but instead relied on precedent affirming the
authority of states to enact criminal statutes applying to conduct of
their respective citizens on the high seas.10 8 Given this novel
approach to the issue, the Fifth Circuit concluded that whatever is
true in respect of legislative jurisdiction for criminal laws is "equally
applicable to wrongful death statutes."' 0 9

Thus by glossing over what should have been the fundamental issue
for analysis, the Fifth Circuit was free to examine the statutory preemption issue in the context of a hopelessly ambiguous federal law.
As a caveat to the operation of the statute as a high seas wrongful
103. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315(B).

104. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (limiting recovery to "compensation for ... pecuniary loss").
105. 754 F.2d at 1277, 1986 AMC at 24.
106. Id. at 1279-86, 1986 AMC at 28-40. The court of appeals treated these questions in
reverse order, thereby answering the question of preemption before concluding that the state
was competent to legislate for the high seas.
107. See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).
108. 754 F.2d at 1285-86, 1986 AMC at 37-38. See also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69,
1941 AMC 825 (1941). Skiriotes rested squarely on the same "maritime and local" analysis

employed in Garcia. Skiriotes, a Florida citizen, was charged with violating a Florida criminal
statute for collecting sponges while on the high seas off the coast of Florida. In holding that
the state criminal statute could apply, the Court reasoned that the state could "govern the
conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the state has a
legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of Congress." Id. at 77, 1941 AMC
at 831. Significantly, the federal government has not passed a fully comprehensive criminal
code for the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction and thus, criminal activity on the high seas is
an appropriate subject for state regulation where a legitimate state interest can be shown.
109. 754 F.2d at 1286, 1986 AMC at 39. The court of appeals asserted that, since the Court
in Skiriotes had referred to The Hamilton, it had thereby endorsed the result in The Hamilton.
Id., 1986 AMC at 38-39. However, there was serious doubt after Moragne and Higginbotham
as to whether application of the "maritime and local" test to high seas deaths would have
confirmed the result in The Hamilton, and that issue clearly was not taken up in Skiriotes.
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death remedy, Section 7 of DOHSA 11 ° provides that "[tihe provisions
of any state statute giving or regulating rights of action for remedies
or death shall not be affected by this chapter."1 1' 1 For the Fifth Circuit, had it not been for an extremely confused legislative history and
a wealth of authority interpreting the statute to the contrary, this
"seemingly simple provision" ' would have been "broad enough on
its face to support [the] argument that if a state statute grants a right
13
to recover for a high seas death, it is not preempted by DOHSA."'
Nonetheless, finding no authority to be controlling,1 14 the Fifth Circuit turned to the hopeless task of discerning the legislative intent of
Section 7 of DOHSA.
Indeed, the history of Section 7 leaves considerable room for argument on either side. As originally drafted, the exception was limited
to "causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any
state." 115 An amendment proposed by Representative Mann, and
ultimately approved by Congress, dropped that limiting language.11 6
Ostensibly because of the uncertainty surrounding Representative
Mann's intent, and because the "debate at the time reflected considerable confusion among the members of Congress concerning the effect
of the amendment,"1' 17 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plain
words of the statute must control and that they clearly provide that
"a state statute which is effective to grant rights resulting from deaths
' 118
on the high seas is not preempted by DOHSA."
Notably, the Fifth Circuit recognized that its holding "[did] not
promote the uniformity in the maritime law which the Supreme Court
has nurtured for many decades." 119 The resulting "anomaly of
allowing state statutes to operate on the high seas but not in territorial
110. 46 U.S.C. § 767.
111. Id.
112. 754 F.2d at 1279, 1986 AMC at 28.

113. Id.
114. Id. at 1282-84, 1986 AMC at 32-36.
115. 59 CONG. REC. 4482 (1920).
116. Id at 4484.
117. 754 F.2d at 1279-80, 1986 AMC at 29. The court of appeals further acknowledged
that the "congressional debate reflects a number of differing concerns and beliefs on the part of
the legislators" and that the "debate is not couched in the most precise legal terminology." Id.
at 1280, 1986 AMC at 30. For further discussion of the content of the debates, see infra notes
124-125.
118. 754 F.2d at 1282, 1986 AMC at 32.
119. Id. at 1284, 1986 AMC at 36. In his dissent, Judge Garza went so far as to say that the
outcome of the case was "as damaging to uniformity in wrongful death actions as it is
illogical." Id. at 1289, 1986 AMC at 45 (citation omitted).
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waters is apparent,"12 0 but in order for Section 7 to be interpreted as a
"symmetrical whole with other developments in maritime wrongful
12 1
death law, the artisan must be Congress and not this court."
Hence, a new trial was ordered on the issue of nonpecuniary damages
22
as authorized by the state wrongful death law.'
By approaching the problem in this manner, it is ironic that the
Fifth Circuit revived the decisions Congress unquestionably had
sought to put to rest by enacting DOHSA. After The Harrisburgand
The Hamilton, courts had little choice but to extend state laws to the
high seas or provide no remedy at all. DOHSA thus provided uniformity where none had existed before. The subject matter had long
demanded a federal response simply by virtue of its scope. After all,
no state could be said to have an interest equal or paramount to that
of the federal government as regards the high seas. Therefore,
DOHSA represented, in legislative form, the negation of any "local"
interest in high seas deaths and the affirmation of the federal interest
which, absent legislative direction, would have authorized rules by
federal common law. The Fifth Circuit virtually ignored the constitutional dimensions of this problem. Of more concern, however, is the
Supreme Court's seeming approval of the Fifth Circuit's method of
analysis, despite reaching a different result.
B.

Supreme Court: Torturing DOHSA In Order to Save It

The Supreme Court recognized in Tallentire 2 3 that it had before it
the culmination of the "tortuous development of the law of wrongful
death in the maritime context." 124 Yet its decision, reversing the
Fifth Circuit's holding on the ground that Section 7 of DOHSA "acts
as a jurisdictional saving clause, and not as a guarantee of the applicability of state substantive law to wrongful deaths on the high seas, '1 25
does little to reverse an already tortuous development of the law. The
120. Id. at 1282-83, 1986 AMC at 34. In his special concurrence Judge Jolly addressed this
concern more pointedly, asserting:
The result we reach in this case creates significant problems in the field of
maritime law becuase it defies reason, runs contrary to the principles of general
precedent in the field, and creates all sorts of internal inconsistencies in the
prosecution of cases dealing with death on the high seas.
Id. at 1289, 1986 AMC at 44.
121. Id. at 1284, 1986 AMC at 36.
122. Id. at 1288-89, 1986 AMC at 44.
123. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 1986 AMC 2113 (1986).
124. Id. at 212, 1986 AMC at 2116.
125. Id. at 232, 1986 AMC at 2134.

1988]

FEDERALISM IN ADMIRALTY

Court attempted to do what all other courts previously confronted
with the issue admitted they could not-make sense of Section 7 of
DOHSA. Although the Court gave meaning to that provision of the
statute, it nonetheless all but stripped the analysis of its constitutional
dimensions.
Agreeing with the court of appeals that "the congressional debates
on Section 7 were exceedingly confused and often ill-informed,"'' 26 the
Court nonetheless embarked on the exercise of discerning the legislative intent of the provision. Drawing an analogy to the "saving to
suitors" clause, 127 the Court found that Representative Mann's
amendment of Section 7 was meant only to have "extended the jurisdictional saving clause to the high seas but in doing so, it did not
implicitly sanction the operation of state wrongful death statutes on
the high seas in the same manner as the saving clause did in territorial
waters."' 28 Although some excerpts from the legislative debates support this view, 129 others imply a more substantial role for Section 7.10
126. Id. at 225, 1986 AMC at 2127.
127. Id. at 222, 1986 AMC at 2125.
128. Id. at 227, 1986 AMC at 2129.
129. The House and Senate Judiciary Committee reports on DOHSA stated that the
remedy provided by DOHSA "is made exclusive for deaths on the high seas" and that "[tihis
is for the purpose of uniformity, as the States cannot properly legislate for the high seas." S.
REP. No. 215, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1919); H.R. REP. No. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1920). However, both reports were printed prior to the debate over and adoption of
Representative Mann's amendment to Section 7 of DOHSA.
In a brief by the author's lead counsel, the petitioner in Tallentire presented a thorough
discussion of the legislative debates. See also Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 56. As is
explained therein, the short debate over the Mann amendment was marked by confusion.
Representative Mann admitted that he had "not examined the report of this bill carefully."
59 CONG. REc. 4484 (1920). In his most elaborate explanation of his amendment, which
apparently was not prepared in advance of its presentation on the floor, Representative Mann
combined his concern about an unduly narrow construction of the phrase "territorial limits"
with a desire to preserve the right to proceed in state court:
I was under the impression that the bill was not intended to take away any
jurisdiction which can now be exercised by any State court. . . . If the
amendment which I have suggested should be agreed to, the bill would not
interfere in any way with rights now granted by any State statute, whether the
cause of action accrued within the territorial limits of the State or not. In other
words, if a man had [a] cause of action and could get service, he could sue in a
State court and not be required to bring suit in the Federal court.
Id. This statement by Representative Mann, read in isolation, is ambiguous and confused. But
when the statement is juxtaposed with his earlier statements on a prior version of the bill, it
appears that Representative Mann did not intend to require enforcement of state law on the
true high seas.
At the time similar legislation had been proposed in a preceding Congress, Representative
Mann had acknowledged that admiralty courts have "jurisdiction of accidents upon the high
seas, where no States have jurisdiction," and that "[i]f an accident occurs on the high seas, you
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In fact, a careful reading of the debates indicates that no clear intent
cannot bring a suit anywhere else than in the admiralty court." 51 CONG. REC. 1928 (1914).
Thus, Representative Mann appears to have believed that a state court had jurisdiction only
over suits for wrongful deaths occuring within the state's legal boundaries. Arguably, in 1920,
Representative Mann was merely seeking to preserve that existing state court jusidiction. His
purpose in proposing deletion of the phrase "territorial limits" from Section 7 may simply have
been to avoid the possibility that the phrase might be construed as designating a rigid threemile line rather than referring to a state's actual legal boundary.
Only a few members were on the floor of the House at the time the Mann amendment was
offered and debated. No one spoke in favor of the amendment other than Representative
Mann. Representatives Dewalt and Reed indicated their understanding that the amendment
was addressed solely to the preservation of the right to a jury trial in state court. See 59 CoNG.
REc.4484-85 (1920). Three other members of the House expressed the conviction that adpotion of the amendment would have no legal consequences with respect to the high seas because,
as a constitutional matter, the uniform federal remedy established by section 7 would be exclusive wherever it applied. Thus, Representative Igoe informed Representative Mann that a suit
could not be maintained pursuant to state law "under your amendment if the ...death
occurred on the high seas.... If we pass a law for admiralty jurisdiction in the United States,
it is exclusive in certain cases." Id. at 4484. Representative Goodykoontz stated, more generally, that "[i]f the amendment prevails, my judgement is that the State courts and their decisions will be superseded by the exclusive power and authority of the admiralty courts ..." Id.
at 4486. See also id. at 4485 (Rep. Volstead: "whenever Congress acts I have no doubt it
excludes the power on the part of the State to pass laws on the same subject.").
The Mann amendment initially was defeated, twelve votes to ten. Id. at 4486. It then was
passed on a roll call vote, without any further explanation of its content or purpose being given
to those members who had not been on the floor earlier. There is no suggestion in the debate
or the votes taken that the House as a whole intended, by its adoption of the Mann amendment, to upset the compromise that had been achieved after years of legislative effort and to
defeat the stated purpose of establishing a uniform and exclusive federal remedy for death on
the high seas.
130. For example, Representative Mann expressed his belief that:
If the amendment which I have suggested should be agreed to, the bill would
not interfere in any way with rights now granted by any State statute, whether
the cause of action accrued within the territorial limits of the State or not. In
other words, if a man had a cause of action and could get service, he could sue in
a State court and not be required to bring suit in Federal court.
59 CONG.REC. at 4484. Also, as an example of the effect of the Mann amendment, Representative Volstead agreed with Representative Sanders that:
the widow of a person who had been killed on the high seas ....may now bring
an action in personam in the State court... [but] if this act is passed ...it will
give that widow the right to elect as to whether she shall proceed under the
terms of the act conferring jurisdiction upon the Federal courts with reference to
this matter, or whether she shall proceed under the State statute. ...
Id. at 4485. Strictly as a matter of statutory interpretation, it would not be unreasonable, in
light of such remarks, to conclude that DOHSA was intended to add to, rather than supplant,
state wrongful death remedies for high seas deaths. The federal remedy thereby would provide
a uniform minimum recovery in all cases, with state remedies, where made available by state
legislatures and by the circumstances of each case, present to augment the federally prescribed
minimum recovery. The constitutional objective of uniformity of remedy, however, would find
such an arrangement to be as offensive as the application of diverse statutes with no federal
remedy at all.
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can be found. And, like the "saving to suitors" clause, the plain
meaning of Section 7 is in fact meaningless outside of its constitutional context.
Indeed, the Court's reliance on Section 7 of DOHSA as the basis
for its decision can be said to be "tortuous" in its own right. At best,
Section 7 states a neutral principle, one which merely confirms that
state wrongful death statutes may apply wherever federal law is
thought to be inadequate. If that appears to beg the question, it is
because the question really ought not to have been whether Section 7
was intended to permit application of state laws, but whether a state
wrongful death law is competent in any event to apply on the high
seas. To be sure, the latter is a question of constitutional interpretation, and the former one of statutory jurisdiction which the Court
normally would favor as the basis of decision.13 1 However, as with its
131. See United States v. Clark, 445 U.S. 23, 27 (1980) (courts "[should] not pass on the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided."). As an additional statutory argument for its
construction of Section 7 of DOHSA, the Court pointed to Section 4 which provides:
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign State on account
of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default occuring upon the high seas, such
right may be maintained in an appropriate action in admiralty in the courts of
the United States without abatement in respect to the amount for which
recovery is authorized, any statute of the United States to the contrary
notwithstanding.
46 U.S.C. § 764. The Tallentire Court construed this provision as evidence that "when Congress wanted to preserve the right to recover under the law of another sovereign for whatever
measure of damages that law might provide.., it did so expressly." 477 U.S. at 222, 1986
AMC at 2125. As Section 7 contains "much more ambiguous" language, id., the Court
declined to construe it as allowing state remedies to be applied in areas where DOHSA applies.
In his dissent, Justice Powell revealed several weaknesses in the majority's statutory arguments. First, Justice Powell pointed to the language in Section 7 extending its terms to state
statutes "giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death," 46 U.S.C. § 767, as the
very sort of explicit terms the majority found present in Section 4 but lacking in Section 7. See
477 U.S. 207, 236-38, 1986 AMC 2113, 2139-42 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell
found the majority's analogy to the saving to suitors clause inapposite. The majority, he
observed, found that Section 7 "as originally proposed, ensured that the Act saved to survivors
of those killed on territorial waters the ability to pursue a state wrongful death remedy in state
court," but then posited that the Mann amendment "extended the jurisdictional saving clause
to the high seas." Id. at 239, 1986 AMC at 2139. As Justice Powell observed:
It is not easy to understand how § 7 was transformed from a provision that
preserved both state jurisdiction and state rights of action in territorial waters,
into a mere "jurisdictional saving clause" with no power to preserve state rights
of action on the high seas. The Mann Amendment did nothing more than
remove a territorial restriction; all other clauses of § 7 remained intact.
Id., 1986 AMC at 2139-40. Overall, the meaning of Section 7, as read only in the context of
the legislative debates and the statutory language as a whole, depends on which way you look
at it. Read in light of the constitutional objective of uniformity, however, Section 7 can have
only one meaning.
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decisions interpreting the "saving to suitors" clause,1 32 interpreting
Section 7 is nothing short of a constitutional inquiry. In other words,
Section 7 should have been interpreted as preserving for state law
whatever could withstand the constitutional analysis as defined by
Jensen and Garcia.a33 Beyond that, Section 7 is irrelevant to the central issue of whether the states can legislate high seas wrongful death
remedies. Although a decision on this basis would inevitably have led
to the same outcome as did the Court's statutory analysis, only
through such an examination of the constitutional issues could the
Court have hoped to quiet the "tortuous" development of law in this
area. Those issues-the extent of a "local interest" in high seas
deaths and the preclusive effect of the federal interest in uniformity of
remedy-should have provided the basis for the Court's decision in
Tallentire.
C. An Interest Analysis Resolution Of Tallentire: The Framework
For Federalism In The Admiralty
Admiralty is one of the special areas of law subject to regulation by
federal common law. a34 As such, it would have been appropriate for
the Tallentire Court to have based its decision on the underlying constitutional themes of admiralty law rather than on the strained statutory analysis it used. By construing DOHSA as consistent with the
constitutional objectives of admiralty-i.e., uniformity of remedythe Court could have fostered a lasting commitment to federalism in
the admiralty while still reaching the correct result. Where the role of
federalism is involved, a balancing of state and federal interests is a
central constitutional theme.1 35 Tallentire presented as near to perfect a case as the Court could have wished for playing out that constitutional theme.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41, 46-51.

134. See supra note 16; infra note 142.
135. The adoption of federal common law necessarily involves the presence of a potential
"significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law." Wallis v.
Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1986). Even a substantial federal interest
must be balanced against the interest of applying state law before an area can be deemed
appropriate for regulation by federal common law. See Miree v. De Kalb County, 433 U.S. 25,
31-33 (1977). In maritime law, "[t]he true inquiry thus becomes one involving the nature of
the state interest... [and] the extent to which such interest intrudes upon federal concerns."
Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 331, 1960 AMC 527, 543 (1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See generally Currie, supra note 14, at 168-70.
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1. The State Interest-Maritime, But Not Local
As grounds for exercising jurisdiction over high seas deaths, states
might advance as sufficient interests the desire to establish and maintain relative geographical boundaries, 13 6 and the desire to protect and
regulate their respective citizens. 137 However, neither interest is actually sufficient when closely examined under the light of high seas
deaths. For example, with respect to establishing and maintaining
geographical boundaries, the extrapolation of existing land boundaries for coastal states would result in criss-crossing and conflicting
boundaries. In as much as such problems plague national boundary
lines, 1 38 they would cause the states to be riddled with even more confusion and conflict. The line demarking the end of territorial waters
avoids such problems.
But that reason alone hardly suffices as an answer to the important
issue of maritime wrongful death remedies, for state boundaries
could, presumably, be approximated in wrongful death cases with reasonable accuracy. The territorial waters line thus also serves the purpose of defining the limit of state regulatory interests. For example, if
extrapolated, Florida's boundaries would extend well into the Atlantic Ocean and California's into the Pacific Ocean. It is for this reason
that the geographical limits of a state's regulatory interests are thus
appropriately defined through a device such as the territorial waters
line.
A state's interest in protecting and regulating its citizens suffers
from similar problems of manageability. All else being equal, a Maine
citizen's death in the far South Pacific would have less immediate
impact on Maine than it would have if the citizen had died off of
Maine's coast. It would be unwieldy at best if each citizen were to
carry along the remedies and responsibilites of her state's wrongful
136. The Court's original jurisdiction has been invoked to resolve disputes between states
over their adjacent lateral seaward boundaries. See, e.g., Texas v. Louisiana, 426 U.S. 465
(1976).
137. The court of appeals in Tallentire took note of the uniform connection of relevant
circumstances--e.g., residence of decedent, tortfeasor, and survivors, route and destination of
travel and limited its opinion accordingly. See Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d
1274, 1286, 1986 AMC 23, 39-40 (5th Cir. 1985). The court of appeals appears to have
believed that the critical factor is the residence of the tortfeasor, basing its ruling on what it
concluded to be "the power of a state to attach legal consequences to the acts of their [sic] own
citizens on the high seas." Id. 1986 AMC at 39.
138. See, e.g., U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, Part II, Section 2 (1983)

(provisions defining the limits of the territorial seas, with rules for drawing boundaries,
incorporating reefs, rivers, bays, ports, adjacent coasts).
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death law around the globe. A decedent's survivor, moreover, may or
may not be a citizen of the decedent's state. Likewise, the decedent
and tortfeasor could be from different states. Finally, a similar patchwork would result if the applicable law were based on the location of
the death rather than on the citizenship of the parties. Thus, no particular state's interest may be deemed superior to another's simply by
virtue of the residence of the decedent, the survivors, or the tortfeasor,
or by the location of the death.
Indeed, accidents of the high seas often are multi-state or multinational in contact. 139 Even the choice of which nation's law should
apply may be difficult in some cases. 14° If further choices had to be
made among state laws based on the location of the death or the
diverse citizenships of those individuals, the matter could become
hopelessly complicated. 141 Such complexities demonstrate more than
just the difficulties that may be encountered in developing- a system
for choosing among state laws for high seas deaths. They suggest
more pointedly the rather weak nature of any given state's interest in
being the law-giver for high seas wrongful deaths. No one state, it
would seem, has a paramount interest over other states in the outcome of high seas wrongful death cases. Hence, the territorial waters
line marks a sensible absolute limit to the permissible seaward influence of each state over its citizens.
This discussion indicates that there was something to Garcia's
"maritime and local" standard after all. The Tallentire Court could
have applied such a test to the circumstances before it and ruled that
the remedy for high seas wrongful deaths, albeit maritime in nature, is
anything but local. Such non-local character, in light of the constitutional principles set forth in Jensen,142 would have precluded application of state law, and the Court's arduous, ultimately fruitless task of
understanding Section 7 could have been avoided. To fully address
such an interest analysis, however, the Court also would have had to
consider whether the exercise of state interests in high seas death
139. Tallentire is unique among the Court's maritime wrongful death cases for presenting
circumstances in which all relevant contacts were with the same state. More typical would be

the circumstances encountered in The Harrisburg,where the vessels were of Pennsylvania
registry, the decedent was a resident of Delaware, and the accident took place in the waters off
of Massachusetts. See supra note 22.

140. See Hellenic Lines v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308-09, 1970 AMC 994, 996-97 (1970);
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 583-91, 1953 AMC 1210, 1219-26 (1953).
141. See supra note 53.
142. See text following note 40.
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cases, however tenuous they may be, would conflict with the federal
interest in exclusive regulation of high seas deaths.
2.

The Federal Interest-Moving to Uniformity Through
Preemption.

The federal interest in applying DOHSA as an exclusive high seas
death remedy derives from the objective of providing for and adhering
to a uniform body of national law that generates consistent and predictable results. Applying state laws to high seas death cases would
prevent uniformity. It would also create a disparity between the remedies available on territorial waters and on the high seas.
This latter point is perhaps the most significant in the analysis. The
Court in Higginbotham recognized that, after Moragne's creation of a
federal common law wrongful death remedy in territorial waters,
143
there was "one national rule [for] fatalities in territorial waters."
The lower courts interpreted this to mean that the Moragne remedy,
as the manifestation of federal common law, had preempted application of state law on the territorial waters.'" Such rulings were compelled by the principle that implementation of federal common law
14 5
dictates that "state law cannot be used."
It follows, therefore, that if the federal interest in maritime death
remedies is so powerful as to override state remedies in state territorial waters, it must also preclude application of state remedies on the
high seas. To hold otherwise would result in one national rule for
territorial waters and a patchwork of state and federal remedies on
the high seas. As even the Fifth Circult acknowledged in Tallentire,
"the anomaly of allowing state statutes to operate on the high seas but
46
not in territorial waters is apparent."'
In Tallentire, the Fifth Circuit reconciled that anamoly by applying
a strange twist to the concept of preemption. Under the hierarchy of
preemption in the context of federal common law, federal common
law preempts state law and federal statutory law preempts federal
common law. Thus, the Fifth Circuit reasoned pursuant to Higginbotham that, on the high seas, "[t]he general maritime law preempts
143. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624 n.18, 1978 AMC 1059, 1064 n.18
(1978).
144. See supra note 100.
145. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 n.7 (1981).
146. Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274, 1282-83, 1986 AMC 23, 34 (5th
Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477 U.S. 207, 1986 AMC 2113 (1986).
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state law, but DOHSA preempts the general maritime law.""4 7 This
hierarchy permitted state law to return to the scene. In other words,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that DOHSA preempted not only the
application of federal common law, but also the preemptive effect of
the federal common law's place in maritime wrongful death remedies.
Such reasoning turns the hierarchy of preemption inside out.
Clearly, were DOHSA repealed today, the Moragne remedy would
prevail on the high seas just as surely as it does in territorial waters.
However, its preemption by DOHSA does not mean that the federal
interest which leads to the use of federal common law in admiralty is
in any way diminished. That interest is constitutional in origin and
cannot be reduced by Congress or the courts. Nor can the mere
enactment of federal legislation, absent a specific provision, enhance
the state interest to a point where it may play a role concurrent with
the federal interest. In short, Moragne represents the dormant but
substantial power of the federal interest in maintaining uniformity of
maritime wrongful death remedies. That interest should have guided
the Tallentire Court to achieve a result which solidified the significance of federalism in the admiralty. Instead, the Court's reliance on
an interpretation of the legislative intent of Section 7 of DOHSA
invites further speculaton on the interplay between state law, federal
common law, and federal statutory law for other maritime law issues.
IV.

CONCLUSION: IN NEED OF A LIFE RAFT FOR FEDERALISM

IN THE ADMIRALTY

When the history of maritime wrongful death remedies from The
Harrisburgto Tallentire is laid out as above, it is difficult not to dwell
upon the irony of the Court's touting of admiralty as an area of federal common law in non-admiralty cases, when all along its maritime
wrongful death cases have conveyed a much different message. The
piecemeal decisional approach taken by the Court has reduced the
subject of maritime personal injury remedies to one of ever-narrowing
inquiry which has almost wholly lost sight of the broad constitutional
themes that surfaced in such early decisions as Jensen and The Lottowanna. Tallentire extends that approach one step further, and thus
it can only be assumed that still narrower issues will soon crystallize
in the lower federal courts and eventually work their way up to the
Supreme Court. There is little reason to anticipate escape from this
quagmire any time soon.
147. Id. at 1283, 1986 AMC at 34.
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To be fair to the Court, the relentless narrowing of issues seems in
part due to an apparent inability of the lower federal courts and admiralty practioners to see the proverbial forest through the trees. The
fact that litigants ignore the broad import of the Court's decisions by
forcing questions one step removed from the last answered by the
Court can only contribute to the Court's increasingly complicated
scheme of maritime wrongful death and personal injury remedies.
Sadly, the lower federal courts appear to be capable of reading the
Court's opinions solely for their precise content rather than for their
full message. As such, the Fifth Circuit was able to distinguish Tal148
lentire from the Higginbotham decision in a few mere sentences,
when in fact the decision reached by the Fifth Circuit is contrary to
all of the clear implications of Higginbotham.149 Indeed, except for
the absence of the exact words precluding application of state remedies to high seas deaths, Higginbotham all but decided the issue later
considered in Tallentire.
On the other hand, the Court has not yet gone out of its way to
discourage the very process which has in large part been the demise of
federalism in the admiralty. It has steadfastly avoided issuing a decision addressing federalism broadly, and has often made a point of
reserving certain issues for further decisions although all rights could
and should have been addressed along with the questions decided. 150
148. For example, the Fifth Circuit disregarded the implications of Higginbotham merely
because the precise question of "[w]hether DOHSA preempts state wrongful death remedies
was not addressed in the decision." 754 F.2d at 1282, 1986 AMC at 34.
149. The Court in Higginbotham proclaimed that when DOHSA "does speak directly to a
question, the courts are not free to 'supplement' Congress' answer so thoroughly the Act
becomes meaningless." Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625, 1978 AMC
1059, 1065 (1978). DOHSA speaks directly and clearly as to the measure of damages. Thus,
the Court concluded that, following its decision not to extend the Moragne remedy to the high
seas, maritime wrongful death remedies would involve the application of "one national rule to
fatalities in territorial waters and a slightly narrower national rule to accidents farther from
land." Id at 624 n.18, 1978 AMC at 1064 n.18. The description of the remedial framework is
incompatible with the notion that state wrongful death statutes could apply to high seas
deaths.
150. Thus, in Tallentire,the Court specifically reserved the issue of "whether the DOHSA
recovery for the beneficiaries' pecuniary loss may be 'supplemented' by a recovery for
decedent's pain and suffering before death under the survival provision of some conceivably
applicable state statute that is intended to apply on the high seas." Offshore Logistics, Inc., v.
Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 215 n.1, 1986 AMC 2113, 2119 n.1 (1986). However, if federalism
and the objective of uniform maritime remedies have any place at all in the admiralty, then
there is no reason why, in the absence of express federal legislation, that the outcome should be
any different for the wrongful death and survival remedies. By reserving the survival remedy
issue in this manner, the Court further diluted the role of federalism in its decision and
reinforced its reliance on a piecemeal approach to maritime law issues.
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Moreover, Tallentire reverses a trend seen in Moragne, Gaudet and
Higginbotham of moving toward an increasing reliance on federalism
principles and the Court's federal common law powers in admiralty.
Although Higginbotham and Tallentire decided similar issues as both
cases addressed the degree of supplementation permissible under
DOHSA, they are nonetheless strikingly dissimilar opinions. Had the
Tallentire court extended rather than truncated the trend started in
Moragne, the tenuous reliance on legislative history and statutory
structure would have been unnecessary. Whatever aml6iguity is left
by Section 7 on the question of state law-and there is plenty of ambiguity-is fully resolved in favor of an exclusive federal remedy when
read in light of the constitutional objective of uniformity of remedy.
Undoubtedly the Court will face the question of federalism and the
admiralty when the issues left open in Tallentire work their ways up
through the judicial "grist mill."1"1 Were it not for the approach
taken in Tallentire, it would seem almost inconceivable that state law
would be permitted to supplement the Moragne remedy in state territorial waters. However, the Court has not spoken explicitly on the
subject and it remains unclear how that question will be resolved.
Similarly, the application of state survival action laws is a question
now thrown up for grabs. DOHSA is silent on these two issues, and
thus the Court might actually be forced to consider the questions in
their constitutional framework. Viewed narrowly, such a decision
would be of as little guidance as Tallentire. Viewed broadly, however,
and the Court could return us to the course set by Moragne, Gaudet
and Higginbotham.
A broad view of federalism's role in the admiralty is the prescription for the Court's ailing maritime jurisprudence. State law need not
be eliminated altogether, but even as Justice Powell recognized in his
dissent in Tallentire, adoption of state law usually will unsettle "the
exclusive, federal character of most aspects of admiralty law." ' u Professor Currie's words thus ring true today as loudly as they did in
1960:
It cannot be gainsaid that the area of federalism and the
admiralty is plagued with inconsistencies. This is, in part,
the unfortunate result of the Court's being called upon to
determine, as in numerous other areas of constitutional litigation, the relative strengths of competing interests-often
151. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408, 1970 AMC 967, 993 (1970).
152. 77 U.S. at 240, 1986 AMC at 2141.
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clearly a matter of preference rather than of reasoning from
established premises. Moreover, in searching for a touchstone to aid in the process of decision, the Court has developed diverging lines of precedent which obscure the
necessity for an earnest inquiry into the merits of the state
and federal interests in new cases. Still worse, the ancient
decisions which form the base of each line were often the
products of entirely distinct theories of legal reasoning.
Thus two criticisms seem warranted: the Court should
assume a more creative role in formulating a cohesive maritime law, and it should pay more
attention to the competing
1 53
policies of nation and state.
Almost thirty years after he issued that advice, we seem no closer to
its fruition. If admiralty is to become a consistent body of law,
another thirty years cannot be let to pass.

153. Currie, supra note 14, at 220.

